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Russian Women: Living in History’s Shadow 
 
Angela Brintlinger and Steven Conn 
 
Marietta Chudakova is a remarkable woman. A literary scholar of international renown, she has 
recently left the safe halls of institutes and research libraries for the world of politics. During the 
1991 coup attempt, she spent all night at the barricades outside Moscow’s “White House.” Five 
years ago, at Yeltsin’s invitation, she became a member of the President’s Pardon Commission, 
meeting weekly to consider the fates of prisoners at federal penitentiaries and work colonies 
throughout Russia. Endeavoring to make a difference through humanitarian work, she has striven 
to improve conditions in orphanages and children’s hospitals in the far-off region of Gornyi 
Altai. When in December of 2000 President Putin was considering adopting the Soviet national 
anthem, Chudakova virtually single-handedly led a campaign in the press to prevent this re-
Sovietization of society. Chudakova believes that she, as a member of the “creative 
intelligentsia,” has an important role to play in helping Russia find its way toward a democratic 
society. 
 
Among other things, Chudakova is not is a Feminist. So she insisted recently while lunching at 
the Ohio State University Faculty Club. 
 
Chudakova embodies the conundrum faced by at least some in the west when they have 
considered what Russians call “the woman question.” On the one hand, in the 20th century 
Russian women achieved levels of education and professionalization and had access to political 
power, to divorce, and to abortion that made some western feminists envious. 
 
On the other hand, Chudakova is surely not alone among Russian women of influence and 
authority who reject categorically the label “feminist.” As women now renegotiate their position 
in a society simultaneously undergoing economic and political transformations, many do not see 
their situation in the same way that western feminists might, and many Russian women still view 
“feminism” as a suspicious import from the United States. As Lena, an ambitious twenty-year-
old student in St. Petersburg, sees it, feminism is something only for women “with personal 
problems.” Tatyana Mamonova, one of the first contemporary Russian feminists, has argued that 
“in Russia women’s consciousness lags behind the laws, and in America the laws lag behind 
women’s consciousness.”  Tanya Yevdokimova, 29, a research librarian at the Academy of 
Sciences, put it more wryly: “The difference between American and Russian women is that 
American women are fighting to work in the coal mines, and Russian women are fighting to get 
out of them.” 
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, discussions of Russia’s “woman question” have tended to 
revolve around two poles. A salacious, sensationalizing press has broadcast and advertised 
Russia’s new “pornocracy,” highlighting the burgeoning sex industry. Some of these reports 
merely titillated. Others wagged a disapproving finger. Few pointed out the irony that the end of 
the state-run Soviet economy and the birth of a so-called free market left some women with no 
other economic alternative. A second direction has been the search, with some success, for 
Russian women who resemble closely their western feminist sisters. Ms. Magazine found its 
Russian feminist in Mamonova (who was exiled abroad in 1979 for just that crime). Intellectuals 
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such as Tatyana Tolstaya have had the opportunity to state their views from the pages of The 
New York Review of Books and other authoritative American journals - views that are weighty, if 
in Tolstaya’s case ardently “non-feminist.” The irony missed in the search for Russian women 
who fit western style is that such women often choose to relocate abroad.  Sexual exploitation 
and the emergence of western-style feminism, albeit with decidedly Russian accents, are both 
significant stories of  the post-Soviet era. But, needless to say, they tell incomplete tales.  
 
The twentieth century began auspiciously enough for Russian women.  The 1918 Bolshevik 
Family Code guaranteed legal equality for women, and access to divorce and abortion was made 
far easier than in most western countries.  Then in the 1930s Stalin declared, in a gesture that 
now seems both comic and sinister, that “the woman question” had been solved. At the end of 
the twentieth century, it was easy to see that Soviet women achieved equality in much the same 
way that five year plans were always met and grain harvests always exceeded predictions.  
Stalin’s declaration did usher in a nearly fifty year freeze on the discussion of feminist issues -- 
not only had the “woman question” not been solved, it went largely unasked.  As Igor, a 
Petersburg delivery man, explained, “For us the 1930s ended about two years ago.”    
 
There has never been one “woman question” in Russia, but rather many. During an extended stay 
in St. Petersburg in the summer of 1999, we attended a conference on women’s issues and 
interviewed a number of women from all over Russia, trying to ascertain for ourselves the state 
of the “woman question” in post-Soviet Russia.  In our conversations with women, it became 
clear that as some test the new economic and political waters, as others see their future in the 
traditions of  the Orthodox church, and still others feel ill-positioned to succeed in the new 
Russia, the historical legacy of life under the Soviet system may prove the most difficult 
challenge for Russian women to overcome.  Our discussions did not provide an answer, but we 
hope that what we learned can add some complexity and nuance to how the question is asked.  
 
 
A Woman’s Conference: “Woman in a World of Male Culture” 
 
As he began to speak, First Vice Governor of St. Petersburg Vyacheslav Shcherbakov looked 
bemused. “Thank you for the invitation to this conference,” he declared, “with its rather 
incomprehensible title.”  The Vice Governor had come to the quiet halls of the Nevsky Institute 
of Language and Culture to open a conference entitled “Woman in a World of Male Culture: The 
Path to Herself.”  Shcherbakov went on to admit that he no more understood the meaning of 
“male culture” than he did the need to examine women’s place in it. “But,” he pronounced 
graciously, “women know what it means; they know what to call their own conference.” Having 
fulfilled his role of imparting a certain bureaucratic gravitas to the proceedings, Shcherbakov 
disappeared at the first coffee break, taking most of the television cameramen with him. 
 
On July 15 & 16, 1999, several dozen women largely from Petersburg, but from as far away as 
Moscow, Saratov, and Tadzhikistan, gathered to consider questions like:  “Who said that women 
and power are not compatible?”  “Why does the stereotype that a real woman is not capable of 
running a business still persist?” “What does women’s culture mean in a traditional society?” 
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That Russian women still find themselves in a “traditional society” is surely true, and 
Shcherbakov was not the only one who felt confused by the conference.  Historian and 
anthropologist Elena Okladnikova reported that even women don’t quite understand the point of 
conferences on women’s issues: “A young journalist from Radio Russia called me the other day 
to ask about the conference, and after I’d explained that we were gathering to talk about 
women’s place in contemporary society, she continued to ask, almost plaintively, ‘But why? I 
still don’t understand. Why is this necessary?’”  
 
The conference was something of a hodge-podge, ranging over a variety of disparate topics.  But 
as Galina Fortunatova, president of the Filosofova Women’s Humanities Institute and one of the 
conference organizers, stressed, bringing people of various disciplines together was a major goal 
of the event. “We need such events,” she stated, “for our own intellectual pleasure.”  
Fortunatova’s “intellectual pleasure” had a certain urgency, however.  “Right now the 
patriarchal-conservative culture is very strong,” she explained, and “we are experiencing a 
‘retreat backwards’.”  
 
The women at the conference - scholars, government advisors, journalists, and teachers - ended 
the event by discussing an issue of concern to them all: women and power. The representation of 
women in political positions has fallen considerably since the demise of the Soviet Union. 
Tatyana Dorutina of the St. Petersburg League of Women Voters pointed out that while 75% of 
middle-level government jobs are now held by women, and 82% of the lowest government jobs 
employ women, in elected positions, women are virtually absent.  Natalya Yevdokimova, a petite 
woman with sharp features and a penetrating voice, and in 1999 the lone woman on St. 
Petersburg’s 49 member city council, put it bluntly, “It is very difficult to work in a male 
collective. You have to be a head above everyone else.” 
 
Perhaps Shcherbakov should not have been so perplexed.  In addition to his vice governorship, 
Shcherbakov heads the Commission for Improving the Position of Women in St. Petersburg, an 
organization attached to city government which brings together women from education, 
business, and other sectors. 
 
If in the United States social problems have generated social movements, then in Russia social 
problems still generate government-sponsored commissions.  This is another legacy of life under 
the Soviet system.  After Russians recovered from the exaltation of pulling statues of Stalin 
down, they realized that the only people who had any experience actually running a country 
were, for better or worse, the now former apparatchiks of the Soviet Union. 
 
Svetlana Yakovleva is such a person.  Fifty years old and trained originally as a mechanical 
engineer, she too has a job in local government, with a wonderfully Soviet-sounding title: Head 
of the Department of Social Prognostication in the Social Development Agency of the 
Committee of Labor and Social Defense of the Population of the City of St. Petersburg.  She is 
also the managing secretary of the Commission for Improving the Position of Women in St. 
Petersburg. 
 
Svetlana’s Commission, created in June, 1997, minced no words in its founding document: 
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“The women of St. Petersburg are full-fledged citizens who have high levels of education and 
employment qualifications. However, it is onto the shoulders of women that the most labor-
intensive and presently unprestigious aspects of life fall: housework and the raising of children, 
health care, education, social resources, culture, and others. The burden of the socio-economic 
costs and political changes which have occurred in our country has fallen heavily onto women, 
and this has led to a severe worsening of their position.” 
 
While Svetlana takes a certain patriotic pride in the fact that “an article about equality of rights 
and opportunities has been in our Constitution since 1978, one year before the United Nations’ 
Convention of 1979,” she acknowledges readily that Soviet women had to live with the “double 
burden” of working both inside and outside the home.  In post-perestroika times, that burden 
may have become worse.  Women remain stuck at the bottom of the employment ladder, and 
without the paternalistic protection of the Soviet state, they can now be fired, or discriminated 
against, even more freely.  As Svetlana pointed out, “women have more work at home, and men 
know this. That’s why they don’t put women in higher positions.” 
 
To address this “worsening” situation, the Commission is charged, almost kaleidoscopically, to 
work on equal legal rights for women, equal participation in government and political life, equal 
access to employment and financial resources, improvement of health care for women, ending 
violence against women, and supporting girls and young women in the areas of education, 
health, and family life.  
 
Its elaborate ten-page plan of measures to be taken reflects the lingering legacy of Soviet 
political culture and divides responsibilities up between a bewildering variety of agencies, 
committees and commissions - nearly two dozen by Svetlana’s count.  Yet both the Commission, 
and the conference, in their apparently simple demands for women’s equality, underscore in two 
senses that many Russian women do not view their problems and the solutions to those problems 
in quite the same way that western women might.   
 
First, the very notion of what “equality” means is not self-evident.  For Svetlana, for example, 
“the fact that women are more busy at home shouldn’t be an issue at work. There should be no 
allowance for the fact that women are burdened at home.” Marina Dibrova of the Nevsky 
Institute, an organizer of the women’s conference and a woman who is succeeding in the new 
Russia, is deeply suspicious of the word equality because it is still too redolent of Soviet era 
rhetoric: “I don’t want equality,” she says, “Under the Soviets we were all ‘equal,’ but some 
people work hard, some are lazy.  In the old system, the result was the same.  I don’t want that.”  
For women like Marina, the very language of equality remains too poisoned to be used. 
 
Second, the Commission stands as a reminder that many Russians still see change as being a 
strictly political process that emanates from the top, through governmental structures.  A feminist 
movement culture, of the kind that has helped drive change in the west, is still nascent in Russia.  
“There’s the answer to your question about a women’s movement,” Tanya Yevdokimova tells us 
with both sadness and sarcasm.  We are standing in front of the grave of Galina Starovoitova, 
strewn with sashes and bouquets from people like the Gorbachevs and the Rostropoviches.  
Starovoitova was the highest flying female politician in the Federal government, and for her 
success and visibility she was assassinated in November, 1998.  For Tanya, the killing was a 
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sobering reminder of the difficulties and risks women still face in the male world of politics: 
“She caused too much trouble, so they killed her.  This was a message for women in politics.” 
           
Whores and Madonnas 
 
It was one of those perfect glasnost moments.  Early in 1987 Phil Donahue brought his particular 
brand of televised talking to Moscow to demonstrate to Russia a world of broadcast possibilities 
they had never dreamed of.  During one of the shows, he asked a woman in the audience a 
question about sex.  She responded: “We have no sex in Russia,” and the audience burst out 
laughing, leaving a befuddled Donahue with a microphone limp in his hand. 
            
As Tanya recalled this episode to us, she explained that under the Soviets, “women’s sexuality 
and femininity were never discussed.”  Pregnancy was certainly encouraged, she points out, but 
she feels that pregnant women were, and still are, viewed suspiciously and treated badly, “even if 
the pregnant woman’s wedding ring is in full view.”  Their bellies show evidence of sex to a 
disapproving world. 
 
There is an extraordinary history of private and family life in the Soviet Union still to be written, 
a history of communal apartments, of children taught to inform on their parents, of the state 
apparatus a third person in every couple’s bed.  In 1918 Bolshevik Aleksandra Kollontai 
summarized how women would achieve emancipation when she wrote “a woman should learn to 
look for support. . .not from men, but. . .from the state.” Under Communist rule, a woman could 
report a cheating husband to the local party boss, and the husband might well be fired from his 
job.  But as Tanya points out, “it is a little unnatural to bring the government into the bedroom.” 
 
While Soviet women had easy access to abortion, they had virtually no access to other forms of 
contraception and virtually no access to information about sex.  The vanguard revolutionary state 
promulgated sexual mores that would have pleased the most prudish Victorian.  Articles 
appearing in official publications as recently as 1980 told readers that the “ideal duration of the 
sexual act” was roughly two minutes and that any man who held back to increase his partner’s 
pleasure risked doing terrible damage to himself.  Tanya chuckles when she remembers her own 
high school course on “married life,” an innovation in Soviet schools in the 1980s, which 
addressed important questions like “who should take out the garbage,” but never mentioned a 
word about sex. 
 
Enter, to fill this void, a proliferation of pornography on the one hand, and a multitude of advice 
books and manuals sponsored by the Orthodox Church on the other.  The former has been much 
reported in the western press, and without question the pornographic turn that Russian culture 
has taken, masquerading often as “sexual liberation” or as part of the “new freedom,” is 
disturbing. 
 
Even in the mainstream economy, women now find themselves subjected to astonishing sexual 
discrimination.  “Help wanted” notices in newspapers routinely specify age and physical type 
when looking for female workers.  Inna Denisenko, an assistant theater director in her mid-30s, 
is emphatic that for older women, job opportunities in the private sector are difficult to come by.  
As for young women, she says cynically, “they can always find jobs as waitresses, secretaries, 
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dancers and so on.”  Inna’s sense is backed by statistics provided by Commission Secretary 
Yakovleva:  70% of the officially registered unemployed work force of St. Petersburg is 
comprised of educated women 40 years of age and older. “Now what’s needed,” she admitted, 
“are young, attractive women.”  And indeed, young women in St. Petersburg in the summer of 
1999 wore their skirts short, their fabrics sheer and clingy, and their heels precariously high. For 
many women, variations on these sartorial themes have become the dress-for-success uniform in 
the new Russian economy. 
 
What may prove at least as significant for the future of women in Russian society, but which has 
been less remarked upon in the west, has been the return of the church to the center stage of 
Russian life.  One can sense the revitalization of the church by merely walking around 
Petersburg.  While many buildings are abandoned and crumbling and roads look permanently 
pitted, lavish sums are being spent restoring and re-gilding the city’s churches. St. Petersburg’s 
Kazan Cathedral symbolizes, as perfectly as any, the re-emergence of the church in Russian life. 
The magnificent 18th century neo-classical building sits off Nevsky Prospect, a semi-circular 
arcade of Corinthian columns reaching out to embrace the street. The building also embraces a 
central tension of Russian life in the past several years. The Soviets turned the cathedral into a 
museum of the history of religion, a didactic monument to state-sponsored atheism. Recently the 
Russian Orthodox Church has regained control of the building, and so therefore, just at the 
moment, the museum and the church sanctuary must share space, each glowering at the other 
across the cathedral’s central aisle. If, in the Soviet past, the state had been the most important 
institution in shaping women’s lives, then in the Russian future, the church may take on that role. 
 
At one level, the return to the church is an expression of “Russianness,” a desire to shape a new 
sense of national identity by reaching back to the one institution that pre-dates the Soviet era, and 
which for many stands as a symbol of opposition to that regime.  Yet from a feminist point of 
view, the very nomenclature of the Orthodox Church gives one pause.  Its all-male hierarchy is 
headed by a “patriarch,” and that term conveys a good sense of the place of women in the 
church.  Needless to say, women can’t be priests, but they are also not permitted to enter certain 
areas of the newly refurbished churches.  They must cover their heads upon entering a church, 
and it is not uncommon for women to be chased out of churches for wearing pants or lipstick.  
Tanya, for one, can’t understand why women should be drawn back to Orthodoxy.  While she is 
in no way nostalgic for the Soviet Union, she points out, “under the Soviets, we tried to achieve 
equality for women.  Now the church wants to put women back . . . in the ‘golden cage.’” It is no 
coincidence, Galina Fortunatova argues, that with the return of a general unemployment for the 
first time since the early 1920s, the patriarchal myth of woman as the “keeper of the hearth” has 
returned as well. 
 
A plethora of church literature, widely available in cheap paperback editions, offers women a 
critique of modern Russia, and proposes solutions straight out of the middle ages.  What Every 
Girl Needs to Know, for example, is a manual for teaching Orthodox girls how to live in the 
secular world, presented in the form of conversations between a mother and her eldest daughter 
Nadenka as the girl grows up. 
 
Nadenka and her mother talk about all sorts of topics, from the usual "where do babies come 
from?" to the evils of television. Nadenka's mother worries about her daughter’s computer class 
in school, since as she has read somewhere, "sitting in front of a computer is very dangerous, 
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especially for girls. Eighty percent of women whose work is connected with computers are 
unable to give birth to healthy children." 
 
Beyond the advice she gives her daughter, Nadenka’s mother is herself an object-lesson for the 
way women should reorient their lives in a post-Soviet, neo-Orthodox Russia.  She has a higher 
education, but gladly abandoned her profession so as to spend her days making her family of 
four children happy, leaving their father (absent entirely in the book) to support them all.  Thus, 
when Nadenka comes to write an eighth grade essay on “The Choice of a Path in Life,” 
motherhood is the obvious, Orthodox answer. 
 
Those who want authentically medieval advice turn to the anonymous 16th century Domostroi, 
or “Rules for a Russian Household,” which is now widely available in cheap new editions.  It is 
certainly an interesting historical artifact.  As Carolyn Pouncy, who translated the Domostroi into 
English in 1994, wrote, “the Domostroi opens a window on a world that. . . has long since 
disappeared.” But our edition, purchased for about eight cents at the Hermitage museum shop - 
one of the few items for sale that was affordable, even cheap, for ordinary Russians - did not 
present the Domostroi entirely as an historical curiosity. There is something insidious about a 
book which provides, among other things, specific instructions on the correct way for a husband 
to beat his wife. 
 
It is impossible to know how seriously readers take this kind of advice.  But as Svetlana 
Yakovleva, herself now a church enthusiast, insisted:  “Women are all believers.”  Whether or 
not Russian mothers and daughters are actually looking to Nadenka and her mother as models, 
they are faced with a new dilemma. Under the Soviets, women never had the opportunity to 
discuss the meaning of their gender identities. Now that they have the chance to do so, they are 
caught between the rock of pornography on the one hand and the hard place of repression 




For Nadya Semakina, 35, the old system might well have worked.  Born in the Udmurtia region 
of central Siberia to peasant parents who worked on a kolkhoz, a collectivized farm, she moved 
to Izhevsk where she found work in a large factory making, among other things, Kalashnikov 
rifles.  After a few years of this, and of enthusiastic Komsomol work recruiting new members for 
the party, she was sent by the factory directors to Leningrad State University to study the History 
of the Communist Party. 
 
That a daughter of peasants from a Siberian ethnic minority could have the chance - at state 
expense - to study at one of the most prestigious universities in the country was one of the 
benefits of life in the Soviet Union.  Nadya’s plan had been to return to her factory, degree in 
hand, to enjoy a life of job security and modest comfort. 
 
Under the Soviet system, the autonomous republics - places that weren’t big enough to be their 
own Soviet Socialist Republic but were too small to be neatly digested by Russia - functioned 
much like distant colonies, enriching the central state in Moscow and in return receiving the 
benefits of Sovietization. Such a place was Udmurtia, which was developed as an outpost of the 
Soviet military-industrial complex. After the collapse of the empire, these places have been 
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hastily and unceremoniously abandoned, left to negotiate their futures with a central government 
that no longer has much use for them, nor interest in them. 
 
Nadya has the high, wide cheek bones of the Udmurts, a Finno-Ugric people.  She laughs easily, 
a musical, infectious laugh which, like her face, makes her seem more open than the Russians of 
St. Petersburg.  It also belies the fact that her life has not unfolded the way she thought it would.   
 
She took her degree in 1990, after Gorbachev cancelled the national history exams, after the 
whole notion of “the history of the communist party” had been discredited as a tasteless joke, 
and after her factory back in Udmurtia had any use for most of its workers, much less a woman 
with a degree in Communist Party propaganda.  She returned to Izhevsk and found work 
teaching at a technical high school.  Stuck there, she was earning 900 rubles a month, roughly 
$36 in 1999. 
 
Nadya was a true believer, and she has had to cope with twin disappointments.  The last ten years 
have demolished every article of faith she grew up with.  In its place, there has been little, and 
she stands as one of the many women for whom the promise of a new Russia has remained 
unfulfilled.  Perhaps not surprisingly, she too has turned to the church, albeit quietly and 
tentatively.  A former candidate for membership in the Communist Party, Nadya was recently 
baptized, and like many other Russian women nowadays she wears her gold cross around her 
neck at all times.  “The Russian people have always been devout,” she says by way of explaining 
the transposition, “and when the Bolsheviks came to power, they transferred their belief from 
God to the leaders. . . .And when people saw you couldn’t believe those leaders, they returned to 
the church.” 
 
Perhaps because of her Soviet education, which taught that the “woman question” had been 
solved, perhaps because of the traditional society in which she was raised, Nadya does not see 
her problems, or indeed any of the hardships that have beset Russian women, in “feminist” 
terms. While she thinks individual women might enter politics “if a woman is not fulfilled in her 
home life, if she needs something more,” she can’t envision a larger women’s political agenda. 
 
Whatever anger Nadya felt at being “betrayed” by the Soviet Union has now melted into a gentle 
sadness.  She describes this in a way which aptly summarizes both a sense of the past and the 
present by saying “under the Soviet system we believed that at any moment the bright future 
would arrive.  And then the future kept moving farther and farther away.”  Nadya, like many 




A lot has happened in Russia since the summer of 1999. The west continues to view the sudden 
transfer of political power and the new reign of Vladimir Putin with some combination of 
suspicion, confusion, and anxiety. But for Russian women, one suspects that the challenges and 
aggravations of daily life, and their perceptions of their own economic and political autonomy 
and power, have changed little. 
 
The biggest and most sinister news to have come out of Russia recently is Putin’s closing of the 
independent television station NTV. This encroachment on a free press has been greeted in the 
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west with alarm and protest. Marietta Chudakova had a different take on the situation. In her 
mind, NTV was itself to blame for not behaving responsibly and with a certain measure of 
restraint in its attacks on the government.  
 
That a self-described “creative intellectual” and opposition figure like Chudakova could impart 
some measure of blame on NTV for its own demise might come as something of a surprise. Yet 
it underscores once again how these issues are viewed differently in Russia and in the west.  The 
“woman question,” then, needs to be asked in the context of how Russians have adopted and 
adapted certain western ideas.  The challenges faced by Russian women, as they negotiate their 
way through both a new political culture and a set of economic convulsions, remind us that in the 
west even oppositional movements have grown in the philosophical soil of the 18th century 
Enlightenment.  Ideas about individual liberty, civil rights and an individual’s responsibilities in 
a democratic society may have been framed, at least in the United States, by slave owners and 
aristocrats, but these same ideas have proven just as inspiring and subversive to abolitionists, 
civil rights marchers and anti-Vietnam protesters.   
 
It is these political traditions, and the institutions built by them, that have come imperfectly and 
incompletely to Russia.  Peter the Great brought the Enlightenment to Russia in the early 18th 
century when he built the city that still bears his name.  Yet enlightened as he might have been, 
he was also a despot who built his city in a fetid swamp on the bones of thousands of serf  
laborers.  Fittingly, among the first buildings to be put up in “the Venice of the North” was one 
that quickly came to be used as a prison.  Feminism in the west has been built upon these same 
principles, but Russian women don’t quite have those traditions upon which to draw. 
 
The Soviet Woman, in Nadya’s words, “was first and foremost an outstanding industrial 
worker.” Heroines for young Soviet women came in two kinds: the officially lauded worker, 
whether on earth like the famed tractor driver Pasha Angelina or in space like the first 
cosmonaut, Valentina Tereshkova, or the “heroine-mother,” who gave birth to many children in 
the years after World War II, helping to rebuild the human resources of the Soviet fatherland. 
Now women talk about “self-realization” - a concept which seems to include happiness in 
personal life as well as the ability to follow one’s own professional and educational interests. As 
Elena Okladnikova re-interpreted the subtitle of the women’s conference, “the path to herself 
means the possibility of becoming a human being.” Through most of the 20th century, what 
discussions there were about the notion of equality revolved almost entirely around the question 
of labor. Tanya Yevdokimova is not the only woman to tell the coal mine joke. It is a standard 
refrain, a humorous shorthand for Russian women to summarize the circumscribed nature of 
what equality meant. “Self-realization” and “becoming a human being” sound at once grander, 
more vague, and more basic, and one wonders, in the new Russia, who will replace Pasha and 
Valentina as models of fully-realized women. 
 
Whatever else their history has done to them, it has left Russians superb ironists.  July 22 is the 
birthday of  Nikolai Chernyshevsky.  Chernyshevsky spent time in a czarist prison where in 1863 
he wrote the influential, proto-revolutionary book What is to Be Done - a book, as it happens, 
whose plot revolves around the problem of women’s equality.  We were reminded of this 
anniversary by the electronic message board in a St. Petersburg subway station in 1999, which 
then flashed, “136 years later and we’re still asking ‘what is to be done?’” Russian women, in 
particular, find themselves just learning how to ask that question. 
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